Regulator Supervisory Power and Bank Loan Contracting
2019年12月26日 （周四） 上午10:00-12:00
Le Zhang is Senior Lecturer of Finance at the Australian National University. He works at the intersection of corporate finance, investment, and political economy, with a focus on understanding how the frictions in financial market and institutions influence the corporate decision making. His research has won Pearson Prize for the Best Paper in Financial Management and has been published in top academic journals such as the Review of Financial Studies and Journal of Financial Intermediation. He teaches corporate finance for undergraduate, postgraduate, MBA, and Executive MBA program.
Using a large sample from 39 countries, we examine the link between a regulator’s supervisory power and bank loan contracting. We find that loans issued by banks that operate under more powerful supervisors have a higher spread, smaller size and shorter maturity. Moreover, these loans are more likely to have covenants and collateral requirements. Importantly, our findings are more pronounced for firms with higher credit risk. Tests based on instrumental variables and country fixed effects regressions provide confirming evidence of a causal link. Overall, these results suggest that a regulator’s supervisory power is an important determinant of banks’ risk-taking in their lending activities.